Investigating the Backstage of Audit Engagements: The Paradox of Team Diversity by Amyar, Firdaus et al.
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal
Investigating the backstage of audit engagements: the paradox of team diversity
Firdaus Amyar, Nunung Nurul Hidayah, Alan Lowe, Margaret Woods,
Article information:
To cite this document:
Firdaus Amyar, Nunung Nurul Hidayah, Alan Lowe, Margaret Woods, (2019) "Investigating
the backstage of audit engagements: the paradox of team diversity", Accounting, Auditing &
Accountability Journal, Vol. 32 Issue: 2, pp.378-400, https://doi.org/10.1108/AAAJ-08-2016-2666
Permanent link to this document:
https://doi.org/10.1108/AAAJ-08-2016-2666
Downloaded on: 17 June 2019, At: 07:04 (PT)
References: this document contains references to 111 other documents.
The fulltext of this document has been downloaded 660 times since 2019*
Users who downloaded this article also downloaded:
(2019),"Individual responses to competing accountability pressures in hybrid organisations: The
case of an English business school", Accounting, Auditing &amp; Accountability Journal, Vol. 32
Iss 3 pp. 727-749 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1108/AAAJ-08-2017-3098">https://doi.org/10.1108/
AAAJ-08-2017-3098</a>
,"Response to Leaf et al.’s critique of Kupferstein’s finding of a possible link between applied
behaviour analysis and post-traumatic stress disorder", Advances in Autism, Vol. 0 Iss 0 pp. - <a
href="https://doi.org/10.1108/AIA-01-2019-0002">https://doi.org/10.1108/AIA-01-2019-0002</a>
Access to this document was granted through an Emerald subscription provided by All users group
For Authors
If you would like to write for this, or any other Emerald publication, then please use our Emerald
for Authors service information about how to choose which publication to write for and submission
guidelines are available for all. Please visit www.emeraldinsight.com/authors for more information.
About Emerald www.emeraldinsight.com
Emerald is a global publisher linking research and practice to the benefit of society. The company
manages a portfolio of more than 290 journals and over 2,350 books and book series volumes, as
well as providing an extensive range of online products and additional customer resources and
services.
Emerald is both COUNTER 4 and TRANSFER compliant. The organization is a partner of the
Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) and also works with Portico and the LOCKSS initiative for
digital archive preservation.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 A
sto
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 A
t 0
7:
04
 1
7 
Ju
ne
 2
01
9 
(P
T)
*Related content and download information correct at time of download.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 A
sto
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 A
t 0
7:
04
 1
7 
Ju
ne
 2
01
9 
(P
T)
Investigating the backstage of
audit engagements: the paradox of
team diversity
Firdaus Amyar
Kesatuan Economics Institute, Bogor, Indonesia
Nunung Nurul Hidayah
Department of Accounting, Aston Business School,
Aston University, Birmingham, UK
Alan Lowe
Department of Accounting, College of Business,
RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia, and
Margaret Woods
Finance and Accounting Group, Aston Business School,
Aston University, Birmingham, UK
Abstract
Purpose – There has been very little qualitative “fieldwork” of audit practice. This is especially the case in
relation to investigations into how audit engagements proceed. The purpose of this paper is to engage with
audit practice in order to explore and explain the internal dynamics and paradoxical conditions within audit
engagement teams.
Design/methodology/approach – The research adopts a qualitative methodology, framed around an
intensive case study that involves several methods of data collection and analysis including interviews,
observation and document analysis. The authors observe audit team practices, work programmes and
organisation including observations of individual and teams involved in audit engagements.
Findings – Using the lens of paradox theory, the authors explore the backstage of audit work, where audit teams
are challenged with recurring contradictory requirements and opposing demands. The authors provide insight on
the complexity associated with inadequate resourcing and planning that tend to stimulate the emergence of
paradoxes in audit engagement work in a government audit context. As a result, the authors identify the
occurrence of cascading reduced audit quality practices (RAQP) as the teams respond to the paradoxes they face.
Originality/value – The authors reveal the interlinked and cumulative coping strategies, namely,
downplaying responsibility and downscaling audit processes. These strategies are performed concurrently
by team leaders and audit members to manage paradoxical tensions. The authors also identified superficial
audit supervision as another type of RAQP performed by team leaders.
Keywords Team diversity, Paradox theory, Audit engagement team, Auditors coping strategies,
Reduced audit quality practices
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Audit assignments require the processing and analysis of large amounts of information
in order to reach a reflective judgment on which to base decisions (Pentland, 1993).
As such, audit is a collective process, typically conducted by a team of individuals with
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differing skills and experience. The diversity of the audit team may have both positive and
negative consequences (Bamber, 1983). It is because of these consequences that we explore
in this paper.
Power (2003, p. 379) argues that we ought to question the “rationalized accounts of the
audit process and explore the complex backstage of practice”. Almost 20 years on, we
believe that this backstage of audit practice remains underexplored, perhaps because of the
hidden nature of much audit work which typically takes place within the client organisation
(Malsch et al., 2013; Malsch and Guénin-Paracini, 2013; Sweeney and Pierce, 2011).
In addition, we note that much audit research has been conducted using what appears as
emotionless algorithmic reasoning (Guénin-Paracini et al., 2014; Francis, 1994), whilst
research on audit “fieldwork” and the social and contextual aspects of such work has been
neglected (Pentland, 1993; Peecher et al., 2007). For example, McPhail (2004) and Nelson and
Tan (2005) both note the lack of research into the emotional dimensions of audit work and
the sources of stress in the auditors’ role (Smith et al., 2010).
In response to this gap in the literature, our research focusses on “looking behind the
audit veil” (Bamber et al., 1998) to illuminate “the backstage of audit work”. We investigate
the challenges in audit work and how auditors respond to the recurring contradictory
pressures and opposing demands that arise in the course of their work. More specifically,
this paper seeks to answer questions about how the audit team respond to differing
contextual conditions, and how team members manage the group dynamics, and any team
conflicts and tensions that they encounter. The focus is on the implications of both
organisational context and group dynamics on audit quality.
The labour-intensive nature of audit work results in high staff costs (Rich et al., 1997;
Bamber and Ramsay, 2000). Aggressive pricing by audit firms (McNair, 1991; Pierce and
Sweeney, 2004; Sweeney and Pierce, 2004) may also place pressures on audit engagement
work. An audit team’s efforts to achieve tight time and cost targets may result in
compromises in audit quality (Beattie and Fearnley, 1998; AICPA, 1978; Rhode, 1978;
Sweeney and Pierce, 2011; McNair, 1991). Auditors may also face conflicting commercial
and professional goals (Suddaby et al., 2009; Picard et al., 2014; Sweeney and McGarry,
2011). This conflict may lead to them engaging in reduced audit quality practices (RAQP),
typically defined as intentional actions taken by an auditor during an engagement which
reduce acceptable standard of audit quality (Kasigwa et al., 2013; Coram et al., 2000;
Herrbach, 2001; Solomon, 1987; Bamber, 1983; Yuen et al., 2013).
To date, research into audit practice has focussed on the private sector. The public
service context is both interesting and arguably more complex than the non-profit or private
sector (Arnaboldi et al., 2015; Bracci et al., 2015; Hood and Dixon, 2015) and is typically
bounded by restrictive standards of efficiency and effectiveness (Humphrey et al., 1993;
Ellwood and Newberry, 2007). Public sector audit and the challenges faced by public sector
audit teams have remained relatively under-researched. This paper addresses this through a
field-based study of audit teams in the Indonesian Audit Body (IAB).
Our case study investigates how paradoxical conditions influence audit teamwork. We
offer evidence to suggest that RAQP are an inevitable consequence of paradoxical
situations. In our research, we focus on resource constraints and the associated controls that
may encourage rather than eliminate RAQP. We do not extol the virtues of control practices,
as a solution, but rather work toward a position that accepts that control actions inevitably
cause tensions, which may be the immediate cause of RAQP. Our findings therefore have
implications for both private and public sector audit teams.
As already noted, audit teams are commonly made up of staff with different individual
characteristics, values, experience and motivations. The paradox theory suggests that the
requirement associated with team diversity and the demand to achieve team cohesion may
emerge and persist in teamwork processes (Smith and Tracey, 2016; Smith and Lewis, 2011).
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We use this theory to analyse the behaviour of the audit teams in our field sample. The
paradox theory enables us to understand how an audit team responds to the conflicting
demands of diversity vs cohesion in an environment that is also characterised by limited
resources and inadequate audit planning. As a result, we find that the backstage of
government audit work can exhibit RAQP, which are a direct response to the paradoxes
faced by the audit team. This offers a characteristic paradoxical situation where the
pressures to complete the audit create the pressure that leads to RAQP.
Our paper contributes to the literature by offering insights into the micro-sociological
aspects of audit teamwork in a government audit setting. We also expand the literature on
auditors’ reactions/coping strategies as they respond to conflicts (Sweeney and Pierce, 2006,
2011; Herrbach, 2005), by uncovering the cascading responses to the paradox of team
diversity. These strategies are performed concurrently by team leaders and audit members
to manage paradoxical tensions. In commenting on the impact of resource shortages, we
also expand the literature on inadequate supervision as one of the factors driving RAQP
(Rhode, 1978; Alderman and Deitrick, 1982; Otley and Pierce, 1996; Herrbach, 2001).
The paper is structured as follows. First, we explain how paradox theory can provide a
useful lens to explore the audit environment Second, we discuss the methods used in this
research and the research context. Next, we present the findings, in which we detail how
organisational complexities can magnify the paradoxes arising from team diversity. The
analysis portrays persistent contradictions between team diversity and team cohesion
leading to cascading RAQP. The paper ends with a summary of the conceptual and practical
implications of our research findings in the discussion and conclusion.
2. Paradox theory and audit team dynamics
The word “paradox” is derived from a Greek word, “paradoxos”, meaning contrary to
expectation (Eisenhardt and Westcott, 1988). Although paradox can be considered to have
numerous meanings, common definitions refer to the existence of contradictory actions,
oppositional tendencies or polarities. Philosophers from ancient Greece to the existentialists
have recognised paradox in human life such as tensions between life and death, self and
other, good and evil (Hampden-Turner, 1981; Schneider, 1990; Lewis, 2000).
Paradoxes are different to dilemmas and dualities. Dilemma has been described as
contradictory elements where each competing alternative poses clear advantages and
disadvantages or involves weighing pros and cons (Smith and Lewis, 2011; McGrath, 1982). A
duality represents an interdependent relationship between contradictory elements that are
mutually constituted and ontologically inseparable. In dualities, it is almost impossible to
describe one element without the other and the tension is resolved through integration (Smith
and Graetz, 2006; Schad et al., 2016; Smith and Lewis, 2011). In a contemporary context, paradox
is described in a processual assumption (Smith and Tracey, 2016) as shown in Figure 1.
2.1 The source of paradox
Paradox is defined as a persistent contradiction between interdependent elements that
appear logical when in isolation, but inconsistent, irrational and absurd when juxtaposed;
and induce responses that embrace tensions simultaneously (Lewis, 2000; Smith and Lewis,
2011; Putnam et al., 2016). Paradoxes involve the existence of contradictory and oppositional
elements that persist and are usually inherent in systems, but are often latent and
unobserved (Smith and Lewis, 2011; Schad et al., 2016). Latent paradoxical elements become
salient to actors due to individual sensemaking, relational dynamics or through
environmental conditions of scarcity/limited resources, plurality and change (Putnam
et al., 2016; Smith and Tracey, 2016; Smith and Lewis, 2011).
In the audit context, the increased environmental complexity in audit assignments
(Prawitt, 1995) has been identified as a source of paradoxical conditions, as task complexity
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and demands on auditors’ decision making and cognitive capacity are increased over time
(Bonner, 1994; Trotman et al., 2009; Rich et al., 1997; Griffith et al., 2015; Dowling, 2009).
Auditors do not work in isolation, highlighting the importance of understanding the
influence of auditors’ interactions with the people, tasks and environment with which they
interact (Humphrey et al., 1993).
2.2 The emergence of paradox
Paradoxes emerge when an organisational setting stimulates distinctions, creates oppositions
and embeds contradictory elements within a system (Smith and Tracey, 2016). The
contradictory elements may become increasingly prominent and persistent in a dynamic and
complex organisation (Lewis, 2000). In exploring the nature of paradox, Schad et al. (2016)
consider paradox as a noun, which refers to concrete, discernible contradictions. The
contradictory features or elements exist and persist simultaneously and synergistically: over
time (Putnam et al., 2016; Schad et al., 2016; Smith and Lewis, 2011); through reflection or
interaction (Ford and Backoff, 1988). These manifest in organisational efforts in collaboration
vs control (e.g. Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003), the individual against the collective
(e.g. Murnighan and Conlon, 1991), or flexibility and efficiency (e.g. Smith and Tushman, 2005).
These contradictory elements are likely to become increasingly exposed and reflect back
on each other, subsequently developing into seemingly irrational or absurd situations.
In an audit context, paradox arises from cost–quality conflicts (Pierce and Sweeney,
2004; DeAngelo, 1981; Watkins et al., 2004; McNair, 1991), and contradictions between
Processual view of the paradox Audit context
Source of
paradox
Inherent contradictions in organisations,
emerging through the acts of
organisations, relational dynamics,
individual sensemaking, increased
environmental plurality or scarcity of
resources. These contradictions result in
growing complexity in organisations
Increased environmental complexity in audit
assignment (Prawitt, 1995), increased task
complexity and demands on auditors decision
making and cognitive capacity (Bonner, 1994;
Trotman et al., 2009; Rich et al., 1997; Griffith
et al., 2015; Dowling, 2009)
Emergence
of paradox
Paradox emerges when organisations
stimulate distinction between
contradictory elements, and maintain the
oppositional, conflictual, inconsistent, and
interdependent nature of the elements.
organisations embed contradictory
elements in the system, making them
persist overtime
Cost-quality conflicts (Pierce and Sweeney, 2004;
DeAngelo, 1981; Watkins et al., 2004; McNair,
1991), resources/infrastructures vs risk
mitigation/strategic system (Beattie and Fearnley,
1998; AICPA, 1978; Rhode, 1978; Curtis and Turley,
2007; Turley and Cooper, 1991), auditors diversity
and cross-cultural collaboration (Pentland, 1993;
Rich et al., 1997; Bamber and Ramsay, 2000)
Responses
to paradox
The contradictions of paradoxical elements
cannot be resolved and provoke dynamic
interactions that require ongoing
processual responses
Defensive responses against groupthink (Parker,
1990), coping mechanism to avoid embarrassment
or threat, and to gain acceptance (Herrbach, 2005;
Sweeney and Pierce, 2011; Sweeney and Pierce,
2006), transactional or passive avoidance
responses (Notgrass et al., 2013)
Source: Smith and Tracey (2016)
Figure 1.
Underlying and
processual assumption
of paradox theory
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resources/infrastructures vs risk mitigation/strategic systems (Beattie and Fearnley, 1998;
AICPA, 1978; Rhode, 1978; Curtis and Turley, 2007; Turley and Cooper, 1991). In the context
of audit in public sector, contradictions between independence/neutrality from the executive
and political mandates/approvals fuels the emergence of paradox (Gendron et al., 2001;
Power, 1999; Gendron et al., 2007; Radcliffe, 1997; Funnell, 1998, 2004; Skærbæk, 2009).
Paradox also emerges within audit team dynamics as supervisors and managers seek to
maintain the diversity of capabilities, identity and cross-cultural collaboration (Pentland,
1993). An audit team may be seen as unique because it is generally small in size, is required
to function for only a short duration and must rapidly coalesce to achieve its objectives (Rich
et al., 1997; Bamber and Ramsay, 2000). The cohesiveness of the team is crucial in managing
the interdependencies of teamwork and the need for knowledge sharing across diverse
expertise (Pentland, 1993). Team cohesion can be defined as “a dynamic process that is
reflected in the tendency for a group to stick together and remain united in the pursuit of its
instrumental objectives and/or for the satisfaction of member affective needs” (Carron et al.,
1998 as cited in Gammage et al., 2001, p. 3).
Audit team cohesion involves a significant level of trust and engagement on the part of
team members (Rich et al., 1997; Bamber and Ramsay, 2000). Cohesion requires interpersonal
attraction, commitment to the task and group pride among diverse members (Beal et al., 2003;
Mullen and Copper, 1994). Diversity within teams can be seen as a double-edged sword, which
leads to both positive and negative effects simultaneously (Pieterse et al., 2013; Srikanth et al.,
2016). While diversity can encourage creativity and possibly better solutions, it can also be
damaging in reducing cohesion and information sharing. The contradictions between team
diversity and team cohesion affects the individuals’ ability to conform to group norms and
concentrate on synergetic interactions (Beal et al., 2003; Gammage et al., 2001).
2.3 Responses to paradox
When team members interact, tensions and conflicts may arise that are hard to manage and
that may prevent collective goals from being achieved (Ford and Backoff, 1988). This can
create unfavourable conditions such as a lack of coordination and also poor communication.
These conditions could be caused by contradictory pressures, such as involvement vs
detachment within the team (e.g. Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003; Vince and Broussine, 1996;
Gibbs, 2009). In paradoxical situations, actors cannot avoid and resolve the contradictions of
paradoxical elements in increasingly complex organisational environments.
These paradoxical situations require ongoing processual responses (Smith and Tracey,
2016). Lewis (2000) discusses how paradoxes create reinforcing cycles, which require
responses or actions to manage them (Lewis, 2000; Cameron and Quinn, 1988). In these
circumstances, actors’ responses to the tensions may be a critical factor for the destiny of the
organisation (Cameron and Quinn, 1988). Paradoxes could be seen as challenges and
opportunities, resulting in defensive responses to reject and resist paradoxes (Lewis, 2000),
or alternatively foster creativity, and enable long-term sustainability (Smith and Tracey,
2016; Smith and Lewis, 2011). In the audit context, conflict within audit teams can have both
positive and negative influences. Positive outcomes may help to promote creativity, provide
new solutions and better decision-making, in addition to encouraging learning and
knowledge sharing (Amason et al., 1995; Jehn, 1995; Notgrass et al., 2013).
Conflict and contradictions between team diversity and team cohesiveness may also
trigger defensive responses against groupthink (Parker, 1990), potentially leading to
unsupported decisions (Notgrass et al., 2013). In contrast, conflict in its negative guise is
more concerned with the inability of the audit team to discuss issues in order to achieve an
optimal resolution, the avoidance of important issues and potentially a splitting of the team
into different factions or sub-groups. Auditors might employ coping mechanisms to deal
with these conflicts, to avoid embarrassment or threat, and to gain acceptance by the
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organisation (Herrbach, 2005; Sweeney and Pierce, 2006, 2011). In this case, auditors modify
the work they perform to manage the perceived engagement constraints.
Notgrass et al. (2013) suggest that as conflict increases a team leader with a transactional
style might search for alternative opinions from the team, propose new ways of examining
assignments and try to account for moral and ethical consequences of decisions. In the audit
context, the conflict between diverse team members and team cohesiveness might affect the
level of audit quality. Auditors might get involved in dysfunctional behaviour (Solomon, 1987;
Bamber et al., 1998), or quality threatening behaviour Coram et al. (2003), reduced audit quality
acts (Kasigwa et al., 2013; Coram et al., 2000; Herrbach, 2001) and irregular auditing (e.g.
Donnelly et al., 2003; Herrbach, 2001; Khan et al., 2013; Paino et al., 2011; Yuen et al., 2013).
Passive leaders, however, might choose to respond only after problems have become serious and
may avoid making decisions (Avolio and Bass, 2004; Frooman et al., 2012; Horwitz et al., 2008).
In our case, a paradox lens enables us to explore the backstage of audit work and how
audit teams respond to the recurring contradictory pressures and opposing requirements
encountered in a government audit setting. The focus is on the impact of team diversity in
respect of issues such as educational background, professional development, employment
history and levels of supervision on behaviour that affects the overall audit quality.
3. Research method
Our research utilised a case study approach. Several methods of data collection were used,
such as interviews, observation and document analysis (Lewis, 2000). We explored in depth
the activities and events relating to one or more individuals in a particular context (Cameron
and Quinn, 1988). Following Malone and Roberts (1996), we use a systematic observation
schedule to ensure that each participant’s behaviour and applicable control systems could
be identified and recorded effectively but there was also flexibility in the plan so that the
schedule could be adjusted to fit changing circumstances and opportunities as they arose
(Alderman and Deitrick, 1982).
3.1 Obtaining access
We initially contacted two internal and one external government audit organisations in
Indonesia with a view to gaining access. In view of the sensitivity of the research topic, we
explained that we would emphasise the anonymity and confidentiality of the participants and
also the audit organisations. Of the three audit organisations in Indonesia[1], one agreed to
grant us full access, to conduct interviews, focus group discussions, and access to relevant
internal documents. After an initial request to observe a total of eight audit teams, we were
able to observe five teams. We made the necessary arrangements with the heads of the audit
units in order to schedule our attachment to the teams and to facilitate data collection.
3.2 Data collection
Observations were conducted by travelling together with the auditors during the audit field
engagement period. We were able to observe and make notes regarding their activities and
also to access and analyse their working papers. We attempted to act as much as possible as
a passive observer in order that we might minimise our impact on them. We observed 30
auditors across five audit teams who were carrying out audit fieldwork at client sites. Total
observation time exceeded 180 hours, and included approximately 40 h of interim[2] audit,
and 150h during substantive[3] audit, as shown in Table I.
We travelled with each audit team throughout their engagement. Formal interviews (see
Table II) and informal conversations were held with the members of audit teams (in auditor
rooms, restaurants, vehicles, etc.). We had access to working papers and other documents
related to the engagement. We were able to watch out for any sign of fatigue, boredom,
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difficulty, worry, upset and other emotions. The main challenge during the observation was
to maintain the trust of the team members. We used observational field notes (Marshall and
Rossman, 2010), consisting of descriptive notes (profile of participants or team, a description
of the physical setting and accounts of particular events or activities), reflective notes (the
researcher’s personal thoughts such as impressions, feelings, ideas and prejudices) and
demographic information (time, place and date where the observation was conducted).
We sought to do this by emphasising that their anonymity would be preserved and
confidentiality maintained. We sought a balance of engagement without being too obtrusive. As
a passive approach was adopted, notes were not taken while observations were taking place on
site, in order to reduce any possible impression of monitoring. We focussed on “essential aims
and partitioned off the setting by observing the group/informants during specific times, in
certain location, and during the course of particular events and/or routines” (Berg, 2001).
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 50 respondents (refer to Tables II and III).
An interview protocol or interview guide was developed for this research. Interviews were
digitally recorded. Interviewees were selected from the hierarchical levels in the audit team:
Observation phases
Audit organisation Audit team Duration Interima Substantiveb Total
IAB Audit Team 1 In days 0 8 8
In hours 0 55 55
Audit Team 2 In days 6 0 6
In hours 39 0 39
Audit Team 3 In days 0 2 2
In hours 0 14 14
Audit Team 4 In days 0 5 5
In hours 0 42 42
Audit Team 5 In days 0 5 5
In hours 0 39 39
Total In days 6 20 26
In hours 39 150 189
Notes: aInterim, the interim audit phase is carried out prior to the year-end of the audited financial
statements and is used for planning purposes as well as an initial evaluation and testing of internal control
and compliance with Law and Regulations; bsubstantive, the final audit phase is conducted after the year-end
of the audited financial statements and consists of various procedures performed by auditors to gain
reasonable assurance of whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement and have been
prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles
Table I.
Detail respondents
Audit team Manager/Auditor-in-charge Supervisor Team leader Team member Total
Audit Team 1 Position 2 1 1 4 9
Interviewees 0 1 1 3 5
Audit Team 2 Position 2 1 1 4 8
Interviewees 1 1 1 1 4
Audit Team 3 Position 2 1 1 4 6
Interviewees 0 1 0 1 2
Audit Team 4 Position 2 1 1 3 7
Interviewees 1 1 1 3 3
Audit Team 5 Position 2 1 1 6 10
Interviewees 0 0 1 5 6
Others Interviewees 2 1 1 4 8
Total Interviewees 4 5 5 17 31
Table II.
Interviews with
auditors
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audit manager, supervisor, team leader and team member[4]. Interviews with observed
auditors (see Table III) were used to elaborate findings from the observations.
Interviews with those auditors not involved in the audit assignments (see Table III) were
carried out based on snowball sampling (Bryman, 2012). Some of non-auditor interviewees,
such as a training centre manager, were selected following the recommendation of a
previous interviewee in order to obtain further relevant information regarding a specific
topic. We completed our data by identifying and collecting relevant documents, such as
working papers, audit manuals, audit reports, etc.
3.3 Data analysis
The data from all methods were analysed using qualitative thematic analysis. Bryman
(2012) points out that thematic analysis is a method for identifying, analysing and reporting
patterns (themes) within data. We analysed the profile of the team and the auditors
observed, the description of the setting and the context of observations. We compared those
data with our reflective observational notes including personal thoughts such as our
impressions, feelings, ideas and prejudices (where we could identify them) about the actual
events and activities. We also corroborated the analysis of our data from interviews and
observations with our review of documents (working papers, audit manuals, etc.) in order to
verify meaning and relevancy (Ritchie et al., 2003, p. 229).
Recurring issues were identified, indexed and triangulated to link various categories and
to develop themes. This process required extreme care in order to ensure that the data were
synthesised into themes without losing content, context and the language in which it was
expressed. We labelled the themes and subthemes to link them to a relevant particular
section of the data in the observational field notes.
The last phase was summarising or synthesising the key themes and then constructing a
thematic chart/matrix. The main themes resulting from our analysis include: “audit team
diversity”; “issues in team coordination”; “lack of team cohesion”; and “threats to audit quality”.
We used Smith and Tracey’s (2016) processual assumption of paradox theory as a reference to
identify the source, the emergence and the responses to paradox, as presented in Figure 1.
Respondents Number of interviewees
Auditees
Auditee from Audit Team 1 1
Auditee from Audit Team 2 1
Other Auditees 4
Total 6
Other divisions
Internal Audit Division Manager 3
Training Centre Division Manager 1
Human Resource Division Manager 1
Research and Development Division Manager 1
Finance Division Manager 2
Total 8
Other stakeholders
Other Internal Government Auditors 2
Private Sector Audit Profession 1
Member of Parliament 1
Common Citizen 1
Total 5
Sum total 19
Table III.
Interviews with
non-auditors
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Finally, we employed respondent validation by presenting our analysis to IAB in October
2017. We received supportive feedback to strengthen our analysis. IAB used our findings to
review the standard of audit engagement and structure a new training programme for junior
auditors in order to improve engagement practices and audit quality. This represents “a
process whereby a researcher provides the people on whom he or she has conducted research
with an account of his or her findings” (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006; Malsch et al., 2013;
Pentland, 1993). It is intended to seek corroboration and confirmation and to ensure that the
findings are congruent with the view of those on whom the research was conducted.
4. Sources of paradox in government audit team engagements
IAB is one of the three audit bodies in Indonesia. IAB conducts financial, performance and
special purpose external audits of state, regional or local governments and also state-owned
and local government-owned enterprises and other government entities. Financial audit is
regulated by national law and includes independent assurances on budgets, balance sheets,
cash flow statements and notes to financial statements. Performance audit, also referred to as a
value-for-money audit, is intended to assess the effectiveness, efficiency and economy of the
auditee. Special purpose audits deal with specific areas outside the scope of financial statements
and performance including, for example, environmental, tax-related or investigative audits.
The IAB has faced a shortage of audit staff across all areas of operation for several years.
A government report in 2012 suggested that the IAB, with 3,963 active auditors, is obliged
to carry out financial audit in more than 3,000 entities. A local government financial
statements’ audit normally consists of six auditors including one audit manager, one
supervisor, one team leader and three more junior auditors. In the case of auditing a
ministry/governmental institution, the number of auditors can require up to 20 auditors,
divided into several sub-teams, each with its own leader. IAB offices in a specific region
usually employ 50 auditors to conduct 25 audits within three months. Staff shortages create
time pressure for the audit teams. Despite the detailed audit expertise requirements defined
by the National Audit standards, the IAB appears to have insufficient resources to form
teams with an appropriate mix of individual expertise, skills and competence.
Resource scarcity at the IAB results, at least in part, from insufficient funding which
constrains the IAB’s ability to both manage its budget and recruit sufficient trained staff.
Such resource shortages mean that the extensive statutory audit requirements cannot be
fulfilled. IAB has insufficient funding to recruit experience auditors. The high number of
audits leaves a limited time to train and develop the leadership skills of junior auditors. As a
result, the number of auditors capable of leading or supervising teams is very limited. There
is a tendency for the IAB to prematurely promote inexperienced individuals to team leader
positions. This can reduce team effectiveness, as a result of inadequate/weak leadership
(Hackman and Wageman, 2005; Pratt and Jiambalvo, 1981; Burke et al., 2006). A senior
supervisor expressed his view of this matter:
In some units, the auditors were prematurely promoted to a higher level. The auditor who has not
had enough experience has been pushed to do a higher role. I mean maybe he is not ready to be a
team leader. (Auditor 14, Supervisor, Interview
As a result, there are times when team leaders appear to be ineffective at keeping work on
track or meeting deadlines. In other instances, team leaders may fail to react as conflicts
emerge, eventually leading to more serious problems within the team. The lack of leadership
capabilities may trigger conflict and resistance from team members, rather than offering a
conduit for resolving problems.
The IAB also struggles with its annual planning activities. The scheduling of auditor
assignments over the year has often proven to be ineffective. It is common practice to
immediately assign a newly appointed auditor to an engagement without giving them time to
386
AAAJ
32,2
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 A
sto
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 A
t 0
7:
04
 1
7 
Ju
ne
 2
01
9 
(P
T)
learn about their new environment and the knowledge required. Auditors are often allocated/
reallocated and transferred from one team to another, as discussed by a team leader below:
We don’t have enough planning. An auditor could be told [he/she is to be] […] included in a team
just before an engagement [often only a couple of days prior]. Although the audit programme
generally does not significantly change from the previous engagement, that doesn’t mean we [the
team] doesn’t need time to understand the context. (Auditor 10, Team Leader, Interview).
Ideally, the audit team membership should remain fixed over the complete audit period
(including in the course of preliminary and substantive tests), but lack of resources and
inadequate planning result in frequent team changes that lead to poor teamwork. Detailed
audit plans are left to the team, rather than managed at a higher level:
Sometimes we just know we are plotted in an engagement just one or two days before the fieldwork
starts. Even just a few hours before the departure to the audit entities the team members can be
changed. It is so difficult for the auditor because he has to understand the audit environment,
auditee’s business process, and the audit procedures before the fieldwork. (Auditor 12, Team
Member, Interview).
The lack of higher level planning means individual auditors are regularly and unpredictably
moved to new assignments. This increases the pressure on individuals to learn new things
and rapidly assimilate into new teams. One impact of a lack of planning is that the balance
between various capabilities, expertise and specialisations is often overlooked when
assembling an audit team. This combination of inadequate resourcing and imbalance of
team skills and experience affects the behaviour of individual team members as well as
overall team effectiveness. This results in the emergence of the paradox of team diversity,
which represents recurring contradiction between team heterogeneity/diversity and the
ability to achieve team cohesion. This is the focus of the next section.
5. Team diversity and the emergence of paradox
The following analysis describes the emergence of the paradox of team diversity. The IAB
stimulates distinctions and embeds persistent contradiction between the need for team
diversity and team cohesion in the audit process. In addition, the scarcity of resources creates
various problems and challenges, including planning, control and team interrelationships.
Audit teams at IAB need to include auditors with varying backgrounds, knowledge, expertise
and proficiency. However, the mix of expertise is not always carefully considered due to the
limited number of auditors and the high number of audits. This results in unplanned or poorly
controlled heterogeneity of team members’ knowledge and skills. This can affect the
coherence of team activity, as represented in Figure 2.
The paradox of team diversity produces a persistent contradiction between
heterogeneity and cohesion. These two important aspects in teamwork appear logical
when in isolation, but inconsistent, when juxtaposed (Lewis, 2000; Smith and Lewis, 2011).
Heterogeneity may have benefits in a complex audit environment that needs a variety of
expertise. On the other hand, it may undermine collaboration among team members
An audit team needs a mix
of auditors with various
knowledge, skills,
proficiency and
backgrounds that may have
benefits in a complex audit
environment that needs a
variety of expertise
Heterogeneity
Cohesion
An audit team needs group
cohesion to achieve team’s
(rather than individual’s)
agreed goals. Individuals
should act in accordance
with team’s objectivesvs
Figure 2.
Paradox of team
diversity
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because some individuals may act independently and maintain too much distance from
other team members:
In my division, there are some auditors who do not come from an accounting background. As an
accountant, according to my knowledge, an audit is the reverse of the accounting process […] but
they do not have that kind of thinking. They do not fully understand what the process and the
documents are, just collecting the documents, and sometimes may not be able to review them in a
comprehensive way. (Auditor 30, Team Member, Interview).
Our observation on the five audit teams (see Table IV ) reveals that heterogeneity has
sometimes led to individual auditors trying to retain too much independence. In this
situation, they can become overly confident in their own expertise. Within a team of diverse
background, skill and knowledge, however, auditors have to work together and engage in
interdependent activities. A team needs to strive for a degree of conformity, collaboration
and connection among its members to produce a high quality audit report. In a financial
statement audit, for example, each auditor is normally responsible for several accounts that
act as the sources of the final financial statements. This means that although they each have
their own individual tasks, their work is also dependent on the other individuals within the
team. Every member has interrelated responsibilities and each member needs to know and
understand what is expected of them as a part of the team:
For some auditors, this variation [team membership] may improve their knowledge […] just like
me, now I know some new things […] but sometimes they are forced to understand something
outside their expertise […] they may share with each other but it may slow down the pace of the
audit. (Auditor 31, Team Member, Interview).
During the observations of Team B, we found that instead of being collaborative, some
auditors seemed to focus too much on their own expertise. Some of the team members
argued that a financial audit only needs to be carried out by those auditors with the relevant
accounting educational background. Auditors without an accounting background were
included in the team to provide the additional skills required, but some of their colleagues
Team
Context of
observation Issues with team cohesion
A Audit of a
provincial
health service
provider
There appeared to be a lack of coordination among team members. Auditors are
working in insolation. The lack of communication among the sub-teams influenced
their approach. At times, the client auditees are asked about the same matter and
documents by different sub-teams
B Audit of a
regional
province
It appeared difficult for the team to develop an agreed plan. Some members suggested
an audit plan to control a subjective approach in selecting evidence. Others felt it was
impractical to carefully consider materiality and risk in selecting audit evidence. Some
inexperience auditors were perceived to be a burden on the teams work
C Audit at a
municipality
Team members with diverse experiences and skills found difficulty in developing
effective teamwork and cohesion. Some auditors choose to elect to do extra work
rather than working with inexperience colleague or those who do not have the same
background. Some inexperienced auditors were somewhat excluded rather brought
into the team. Communication with senior members was very limited
D Audit of a
state-owned
enterprise
Different approaches were taken by individual team members, as most of the team
were not familiar with the audit context. Inexperience auditors coordinated
ineffectually with other members. The team exhibited a lack of planning and
coordination to develop proper procedure
E Audit at a
national
custom office
Team members’ approach in selecting evidence varied. Some selected evidence based
on convenience without coordination with other members of the team. There were
very limited discussions or monitoring on the approach to complete the review
Table IV.
Issues with team
cohesion
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felt their accounting knowledge was inadequate. This affected the cohesion of the team as
the following comment indicates:
When doing a financial statement audit sometimes our team are struggling because the auditors
may come from too many different backgrounds. (Auditor 30, Team Leader, Interview).
It proved difficult for this team to develop an agreed plan. The team members had
conflicting views in considering the level of materiality and risk. They also had difficulties
to achieve an agreed approach in selecting evidence. Auditors need to make an effort to
share their knowledge. This may, simultaneously, slow down the pace of the audit creating
another potential contradiction.
Sharing seems to be sporadic in Team D. Individual auditors were observed to discuss
progress and work practices with the colleagues of similar background. Some of them may
be reluctant to help others because they believe that may have too different a point of view.
One auditor explained:
Three of us in the team are not familiar with this audit (they have just been moved from other
units). So we can’t help each other. (Auditor 4, Team Member, Interview).
In Team E, auditors in the field often reported that they had not known each other before the
first day of the audit fieldwork. Interviewees argued that they might need some time to get
to know each other through regular interaction. They went on to suggest that coming to
share the team goals must be built over time:
If we talk about individual perspectives, every person will be different, type X and Y person. One
may be self-motivated while others may not. (Auditor 32, Team Member, Interview).
Individual professional judgement may sometimes conflict with group decisions. This can
happen where team members with various academic backgrounds and areas of expertise
reach different judgements. Even though all of them have undergone the relevant training
and certification to acquire the required accounting and auditing skills this is only part of
what may affect professional judgement. Psychological and interpersonal aspects may also
influence decision making and team cohesion:
There are many instances where individuals within a team cannot cooperate with other team
members. They tend to work on their own without any discussions or consultations with others. They
do not always appreciate the importance of team cohesion among team members, team leader and
supervisor to achieve the objective of an audit engagement. (Auditor 18, Team Leader, Interview).
Problems may emerge where team members do not conform to the team’s accepted
behaviour, which can undermine team cohesion. The main tension arises from the need for
auditors with various backgrounds, knowledge and skills to maintain teamwork and team
cohesion within the variations across individual characteristics, values, and motivation. The
paradox escalates as many inexperience team leaders who are prematurely promoted lack
the capability to lead the teams. Audit teams cannot avoid and resolve paradoxical
situations. The persistence of paradoxes within audit engagement work requires audit
teams to engage in ongoing processual responses in their efforts to adjust and work
effectively in diverse and complex situations (Smith and Tracey, 2016). These issues are
discussed in the following section.
6. Cascading responses to the paradox of team diversity
This section provides evidence and discussion of what we conceptualise as the cascading
responses to the paradoxes that are created by team diversity. While we describe some
RAQP arising within each team, some of these instances are much more concerning than
others. Nevertheless, our observations of the five audit teams indicate that contradictions
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between diversity and cohesion in individual audit assignments may persist long enough to
become disruptive. This can provoke iterative or cascading responses at both the team
leader and team member level, as shown in Figure 3. This is where we identify the actions of
team leaders and other team members as influencing the behaviour of others. The actions
we identify create an environment in which RAQP is best seen as being an inevitable and
perhaps acceptable response to paradoxical pressures, which create environments where
insufficient time or resources impact the audit assignments in a systemic way.
Some team leaders engage in practices that downplay their responsibility to supervise,
monitor and manage tensions in the team. This cascades down and provides discretionary space
for team members to downscale the audit process by avoiding legitimate audit tasks. In these
circumstances, the team leaders withdraw themselves somewhat from the team by performing
Team Context of
observation Evidence of Superficial audit supervision
Evidence of Non tested sample and
premature sign-off
A Audit of a
provincial
health
service
provider
The team leader was away from the team
for much of the engagement. The audit
engagement was lacking coordination and
clarity of work tasks
The team members undertake a minimum
verification on client’ stock without proper
planning. They checked a sample well below
what was required. They conducted the
procedure in a very short time with
insufficient depth
B Audit of a
regional
province
The team leader seemed to lack
confidence in his knowledge of recent
changes of regulation relevant to the
auditee context. She/he did visit the team,
but conducted a very light review. Largely
leaving the team without supervision.
Individual audit steps and procedures
were not managed. A visit was made to
the audit team at the end of the
fieldwork/assignment and a very light
check on findings conducted
Team members were in charge of one of the 
province’ social donation accounts. They did
not follow the required sample selection and
procedure for such a review. They argued
that it would be difficult to follow the
requirements and procedures. They did not
take further examination on any suspicious
items and decided to conclude the review
without further checks
C Audit of a
municipality
Team leader admitted that the team did
not complete the overall review. There are
no signatures of the team leader and audit
manager in the working papers, although
they visited the team during the
preliminary fieldwork. The team leader
asked about general problems without
looking at the documents in detail
Team members did not complete an overall
review. They argue that it was difficulties to
collect the entire sample, because the
volume of evidence was very high. They only
selected the evidence representing the
largest budget centre and the worst
documentation. In the end, they conclude
their findings without including valid
evidence
D Audit of a
state-owned
enterprise
Team leader stated that she was
appointed to lead the team although she
has no experience on the auditee’s
context and this type of audit. Only one
auditor in her team has experience and
has audited in the same context before
Most of the team members are not familiar
with auditing the government subsidy
programme administered by the client. The
work exhibits a lack of planning and proper
procedure. Team members appeared to take
the review too lightly
E Audit at a
national
custom
office
The team leader conducted a Superficial
review. He/she sometimes asks how
things have been done, but only in general
terms. The working papers, other
documents and audit procedures are not
checked. The team leader does not feel
that the standardized checks are relevant.
He/she believes there are many
unnecessary steps, which waste time
Team members have conducted a very light
review on the selected evidence. A sample
was selected based on convenience.
Shortcuts to complete the review were
clearly taken. Team members to simply
follow and avoid what the team leader
believes are unnecessary stepsFigure 3.Evidence of cascading
responses to paradox
of team diversity
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superficial supervision (see Figure 3). We posit that superficial supervision occurs as a relatively
inexperienced team leader chooses to withdraw themselves from the sometimes, necessary,
intensive monitoring of the team. This practice may be perceived to shield their lack of capability
from the team. Superficial audit supervision is a form of RAQP conducted by team leaders:
The supervisor does not carry out supervisory control function properly. When we seek for advice
sometimes they just tell us to do what we think we should do. (Auditor 33, TeamMember, Interview).
Managing team diversity to achieve team cohesion becomes even more difficult to achieve
when individuals who are inexperienced and lack expertise are prematurely promoted.
Some inexperienced team leaders do not proactively monitor the team’s work on a daily
basis, waiting instead for weekly reports, and rarely communicate directly with their team:
I had a team leader who didn’t direct us at all. When I asked what to do next, he just said just do
what you need to do. After [the client] entry briefing he was always busy […] I felt a bit desperate.
(Auditor 33, Team Member, Interview).
We observed team leader practices that focussed too much on resolving issues as they arose,
rather than detailed planning and monitoring. One auditor gives his view:
They did not check our working papers […] some supervisors just asked for our main findings.
They very seldom asked about the audit procedures or whether we had difficulties in performing
them. At best they asked whether the data were easy to get or not […]. (Auditor 23, Male, Team
Member, Interview)
In these cases, the team leaders rarely checked all completed procedures and failed to review
the adequacy of evidence in individual’s working papers. Such team leaders largely rely for
assurance on general discussions with the team without looking at the written reports and
the documented evidence attached to the working papers.
When a team leader fails to provide adequate oversight or manage conflict within a team,
there is an opportunity for auditors to engage in downscaling the audit process by engaging
in two different types of RAQP: reducing or non-testing items in a sample and premature
sign-off (see Figure 3). Team members engage in these types of RAQP, to maintain an
acceptable work environment and manage work related anxiety (Herrbach, 2005; Sweeney
and Pierce, 2011; Sweeney and Pierce, 2006). We observed how a team member resorted to
reducing/not testing the relevant evidence:
So we reduce [for test] the amount of samples selected and there are some client’s explanations that
we still have doubt about but we just accept them (without further examination). (Auditor 5, Team
Member, Interview).
Team A (see Figure 3) was assigned to test an assertion by management of the existence of
certain medical equipment. According to the audit procedure on capital expenditure testing,
the team should “conduct a physical examination of the existence of the asset resulted from
the spending of capital expenditure”. The auditor designated to carry out this check needed
to conduct a stock examination on that same day, but left without doing so. This exchange
is shown below (and is followed by other brief vignettes):
Auditor A: I think the auditee has conducted a proper purchase procedure […].
Auditor B: Are you sure? I am not convinced.
Auditor A: Actually, I am not really convinced. I just get the confirmation from someone in charge.
Auditor B: But, the procedure says that we need to conduct physical examination instead of just
relying on his reports.
Auditor A: I think it is enough […] we don’t need to do anything else
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Some members of the team had been reviewing purchase order documents for the assets in
question since the morning, but then the other auditor tells them that he has decided not to
perform the physical test. He states that the auditee has conducted proper purchase
procedures and there has been a report from the employee in charge of the purchase stating
that the assets have been received:
Only the auditor and God know whether he really has tested all the items in the sample or not. We
really don’t know if they left the items because, for example, he couldn’t get the documents or
because of other reasons. (Auditor 1, Team Leader/Supervisor, Interview)
The supervisor above decides to ignore the need to check whether or not the auditor has
adequately confirmed the asset’s existence. Arguably, this may be difficult because auditors
are not required to keep the tested documents in their working papers, but the example
illustrates how RAQP can cascade down. Ineffective supervision is compounded and
mirrored in the failure to complete a simple asset test.
In Team B, some auditors stopped at a point at which they suspected irregularities,
without either extending their efforts or seeking alternative instructions. The auditors
claimed they were reluctant to revise procedures, as they would simply be reported to the
team leader/supervisor who had been failing to monitor the audit engagement effectively. In
other words, their additional work would go unrecognised. Reviews of working papers
during the final stage of the audit reveal that team members engaged in premature sign-off
and reluctant to challenge the outcome, the inexperienced team leader signed and approved
the completion of the audit.
On a different audit, two auditors of Team C visited a construction site accompanied by
two client representatives. They merely had a brief chat and took some photos of the
building without even looking at the documents they had brought or matching them against
the physical evidence in the field. One of the team members stated that:
When examining the cupboards procurement, I was required to check the existence of them, and
check whether the specifications match the available documents. They matched I said […] [to
complete/sign-off the procedure], although I was pretty sure there seemed to be something wrong
with them. (Auditor 11, Team Member, Interview)
Following conversations held with one of the auditors during the examination, it seemed
they did not have the requisite knowledge to conduct this examination and had just been
moved from another team. A lack of communication and cohesion with other members of
the team made them reluctant to request help from a more experienced individual.
The above examples illustrate the scope for inadequate testing and premature sign-off that
breaches accepted standards of audit quality. We therefore conclude that in response to time
pressures, unresolved tensions, failings in supervision and a lack of team cohesion, team
members are able to engage in RAQP. As such, organisational characteristics facilitate the
emergence of paradox of team diversity which stimulate the cascading down of poor audit
practice from team leader to the team member level. We would reiterate our comment from the
start of this section that the paradoxes we identify are specific to the context we have
investigated but would likely be representative of paradoxes found elsewhere in audit
teamwork. Paradox is inherent in much organisational teamwork and audit is no exception.
7. Discussion and conclusion
Much conventional academic research on auditing is limited to applications using
experimental as opposed to real-world settings. Power (2003) argues that “very little is
known about auditing in practical, as opposed to experimental, settings”. The research
discussed in this paper seeks to respond to Power’s call by providing findings from a
real-world setting that contribute to enhance our understanding of auditors’ behaviour
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through case study and observation. Our research aim was to explore the response of audit
teams to the recurring contradictory requirements encountered in the complex environment
of government audit practice. Our findings offered insights on concerns around inadequate
resourcing and planning that tend to stimulate paradoxes in audit engagement work. Our
research has sought to examine the backstage of government audit work and reveal aspects
of resourcing and planning and especially team diversity that give rise to complex
paradoxes in audit work. We identify how these paradoxical conditions promote RAQP,
which we interpret as cascading through the audit team.
7.1 Micro-sociological aspects of audit team practices
Our research has explored contradictory requirements in audit assignments from a
sociological perspective as we seek a more substantial understanding of the “the backstage
of audit work” (Bamber et al., 1998). Despite the unique and critical role of government audit
institutions in society, empirical attempts to consider the micro-sociological aspect of audit
team processes have remained limited (Gendron et al., 2001; Power, 1999; Gendron et al.,
2007; Radcliffe, 1997; Funnell, 2004; Funnell, 1998; Skærbæk, 2009). We provide a deeper
understanding of the audit engagement process (Solomon and Trotman, 2003) by revealing
auditor behaviour, that cannot effectively be explored in other methods such as survey
questionnaire or experimental research (Herrbach, 2002).
We argue that audit scholarship needs to take into account internal elements and
dynamic effects in the audit process, especially in the work of the audit team (Gittell, 2004).
Taking a micro-sociological perspective of team processes extends our understanding of the
internal and external infrastructure in the audit process (Smith and Berg, 1987). Our
evidence confirms the value of ensuring that audit research should take account of the
complexity and resourcing challenges in government audit infrastructure (Notgrass et al.,
2013; Vera-Munoz et al., 2006; Bamber et al., 1998).
The empirical evidence gathered in this research supports the existence of opposing
demands as audit teams work across multiple knowledge bases (Carron et al., 1998;
Gammage et al., 2001; Smith and Berg, 1987) and face the challenge of heterogeneity within
the team (Smith and Berg, 1987). We demonstrate the challenge of a team’s ability to work
with a lack of common values and inexperienced team leaders, and show that audit teams
often struggle to manage opposing demands within complex interdependent audit tasks,
roles, capabilities and knowledge.
Some of these paradoxes arise from the need to ensure plurality in team members’
educational and technical backgrounds whilst still aiming to nurture cohesion. The five
audit teams we followed displayed poor coordination and cohesion among team members
but also in relations with the team leader. Poor coordination can result in unbalanced
workloads, tough deadlines and excessive workloads. Some supervisors and team leaders
with limited experience (possibly due to premature promotion) were seen to struggle to
coordinate work effectively (Notgrass et al., 2013).
Diversity can produce positive effects but these may be accompanied by lower levels of
coordination due to the pursuit of personal self-interest, conflict between members and poor
communication (Srikanth et al., 2016; Jehn, 1995; Amason et al., 1995). It can then be a
challenging task to achieve shared team values in the face of these conflicting motivations,
personal values and characteristics. Paradoxes within the audit team may emerge to
reinforce organisational contradictions and reveal organisational problems such as staff
shortages and inadequate planning.
7.2 RAQP as cascading responses to paradox in audit team
Our analysis provides a different and more intensive approach to studying RAQP (Coram
et al., 2008). We expand the discussion on auditor’s responses to conflicts (Sweeney and
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Pierce, 2011), in which auditors employ defence mechanisms (Sweeney and Pierce, 2006) or a
coping mechanism (Herrbach, 2005). Our contribution reveals two types of coping strategies
adopted by team leaders and auditors. We identified RAQP practices by both team leaders
and team members represent the cascading responses to paradox in audit team.
We argue that RAQP, in the complex environment of government auditing, are cascade
down from team leader to team member. Team leaders’ superficial supervision opens up an
opportunity for audit team members to restrict their audit tasks by reducing sample size,
which in turn allows premature sign-off. We argue that inadequate supervision is one of the
factors driving RAQP (Rhode, 1978; Alderman and Deitrick, 1982; Otley and Pierce, 1996)
but our focus here is different to the existing literature in revealing the complementarity of
inexperience among audit team leaders and team members. We show that auditors adjust
their practices and, in the extreme, engage in RAQP to control the opposing demands they
face in the audit process. RAQP becomes a dynamic process that auditors use to manage the
paradoxes they face (Srikanth et al., 2016). RAQP also becomes a response to ineffective or
poor leadership (Srikanth et al., 2016). In our case, RAQP becomes an attractive short-term
solution for addressing a paradox in audit team composition (Pentland, 1993).
Our findings suggest that it is possible to overcome an implication in the literature that
informants may be unwilling to reveal their true behaviours in responding to RAQP
research (Rhode, 1978; Alderman and Deitrick, 1982; Otley and Pierce, 1996; Herrbach,
2001). Our micro-level case study would suggest otherwise and adds new insights to the
existing RAQP research that relies on self-reported surveys, questionnaires, experiments
and other documentary evidence using quantified measurement and variables (Herrbach,
2001). The existing studies tend to explore RAQP as a homogeneous group of practices
and aggregated auditors’ responses (Coram et al., 2008). Our paper provides a new insight
on how RAQP is a complex and diverse part of team practice. Some of the RAQP we
describe as committed by senior auditors/team leader provides discretionary space for
similar practices by team members.
7.3 Conclusion
While team diversity is often valued in audit work, this paper provides evidence that it also
poses problems that result in potentially poorly coordinated and incoherent teamwork. Our
research reveals that organisational problems can exacerbate these contradictions. The
problems include under-resourcing and inadequate training, which can lead to ineffective
audit team selection processes and excessive transfer of individual auditors between teams.
Some research has suggested a lack of commitment among national institutes in providing
effective oversight function of the audit process (Humphrey, 2008). Humphrey attributes
this to under-resourcing and a consequent lack of capacity to innovate in the advancement
of auditing knowledge. A lack of training is also presented in our research findings. Senior
auditors have important roles, which are not restricted to technical knowledge but extend to
the effective management of engagement teams.
Our empirical analysis indicated that the paradox of team diversity emerged in a context
of constrained resourcing that leads to RAQP. Evidence from our interactions with senior
managers within IAB suggested that these contradictory pressures are persistent and
difficult to resolve. Consequently, supervisors and team members simultaneously engaged
in interrelated RAQP actions. Supervisors performed superficial supervision due to poor
training. These failings in providing leadership to the team and monitoring teamwork, gave
discretion for auditors to engage in actions including the reduction of sampled items and
premature sign-off. We describe this as resulting in cascading RAQP.
According to Gendron and Bédard (2001), auditing research is useful to a particular
subset of auditing research stakeholders, i.e. to auditors and members of the auditing
profession. We hope that our study of everyday audit practice will prove helpful to
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government and private sector audit organisations, professional bodies and government
audit standard setters (Sikka et al., 1998; Porter, 1993; Power, 2000). Our research provides a
different perspective on the dynamics and paradoxes within the audit process, and perhaps
greater insight into the occurrence of RAQP. Over time, a deeper understanding of what
factors trigger RAQP will serve to enhance audit quality across all sectors of the economy.
Notes
1. We contacted three government audit bodies who have responsibility for the internal and
external inspection of both central and regional/local government, state-owned enterprises, all
ministries, political parties’ budgets, activities and programmes under the special order or
assignment of the president.
2. The interim audit, used mainly to assess and test the auditee’s internal control for developing
strategies for substantive tests in the form of an audit programme.
3. Substantive testing is a part of the financial statement audit phase that is conducted to examine
the financial statement accounts, transactions and activities/programme in order to test
management assertions.
4. A supervisor deals with the monitoring and evaluation of the audit, ensuring the audit takes place
in accordance with the audit programme. The audit manager (also known as the auditor-in-charge)
acts as a manager with responsibility for quality control across the whole audit process and its
compliance with the auditing standards.
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